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REDEEMING SECURITIES THROUGH EQUITY
FUNDING: THE SECURITY HOLDER'S DILEMMA
American corporations seeking to obtain capital for business investments
may issue either long-term debt securities or shares of stock.' Corporate bonds
and debentures are common long-term debt securities.2 Generally, a corpora-
tion offering bonds and debentures for public sale must issue the debt securities
under an indenture agreement3 registered under the Trust Indenture Act of
1939. 4 The indenture agreement contains contractual provisions establishing
1. AmmICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON IDENTURES 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as COMMENTARIES]. Two types of securities that corporations issue to obtain capital are equity
and debt securities. Id. The purchase of a share of stock creates an equitable ownership in a
corporation. Id. An equity security holder has some rights of ownership and control over the
corporation. Id. Holders of debt securities, however, possess no ownership interest in a corpora-
tion. See id. Debt security investors merely lend money to a company and receive in exchange
a security evidencing the debt. See id. at 1-2. The security holder generally expects only periodic
interest payments and the eventual return of his principal on the investment. Id. at 2. In addition
to issuing pure debt and equity securities, corporations also may issue "hybrid securities" that
contain both debt and equity features. Id. at 522-23. For example, a convertible debenture operates
as a debt security but also provides the debenture holder with the right to convert the debenture
into other securities, usually shares of stock, in the issuing company at a specified rate of ex-
change. Id.
2. See id. at 1. A bond is a long-term debt obligation secured by a mortgage, property
lien, or other corporate asset. Id. at 7 n.3. Debentures, on the other hand, are unsecured long-
term debt obligations. Id. Previously, mortgage bonds were a popular form of long-term financ-
ing because the mortgage evidenced security for the bond holder. Id. at 5. Mortgage bonds, however,
are subject to several drawbacks. For example, a company can issue mortgage bonds only to
the extent of the company's property. See id. at 6. To expand financing opportunities beyond
the asset limitations in mortgage situations, companies began to issue debentures unsecured by
either a mortgage or a lien. See id. at 7. To make debentures attractive to investors, issuing
companies included covenants in their contracts with the debenture purchasers to afford protec-
tion to the debenture holders' investment and to assure that the issuer met his payment obliga-
tions. Id. See generally RODGERS, The Corporation Trust Indenture Project, 20 BUS. LAW 551
(1965) (general history of mortgage bonds and debentures).
3. See J. KENNEDY & R. LANDAU, CORPORATE TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
19 (1975). An indenture agreement is a written document setting forth the rights and obligations
of the debt security issuer, security purchaser, and an indenture trustee. Id. The indenture agree-
ment designates an indenture trustee, usually a bank, who is responsible for protecting the rights
of the debt security holders. See id. at 23-24. An indenture usually contains detailed contractual
provisions with respect to the terms of interest payments, rights of redemption, and all other
agreements affecting the parties' rights. See id. at 19-21.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1982). The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 requires that most
debt securities be "qualified" by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) before the issuing
company may sell the security to the public. See Zeffiro v. Pennsylvania Banking and Trust,
623 F.2d 290, 293 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1005 (1982). SEC qualification of a
debt security occurs when the security's registration takes effect. 15 U.S.C. § 77iii (1982). SEC
qualification requires that a company issue a debenture under an indenture, designating a qualified
indenture trustee, and the indenture must set forth the statutory substantive duties imposed on
the indenture trustee. See id. §§ 77jjj-77rrr (1982); see also Zeffiro, 623 F.2d at 293. The inden-
ture trustee is responsible for enforcing the indenture agreement in accordance with the terms
contained in the agreement. See KENNEDY & LANDAU, supra note 3, at 27.
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the rights and obligations of the security issuer and the security holder.' In
addition to issuing debt securities, a corporation may issue shares of stock.
Corporations issuing stock to raise capital generally classify the stock as either
common or preferred.6 A prospectus accompanying the stock sale usually sets
forth any contractual agreements between the stock issuer and the stock
purchaser. 7
A provision present in virtually every indenture or preferred stock
agreement 8 provides the issuing company with a right of redemption of the
issued security. 9 If the indenture or stock agreement does not contain a provi-
sion allowing for redemption, the issuer has no right to redeem the securities
prior to their maturity date.'I A company issuing securities may desire to reserve
the option to redeem the securities for various reasons. Redeeming securities
before their stated maturity date may allow a company to complete business
transactions such as a merger." In times of fluctuating interest rates, the
redemption of outstanding securities may end high interest rate payments to
security holders that burden the company.'I The security holder, on the other
hand, does not want the issuing company to have unlimited redemption rights. 3
The investor who purchases debt securities or preferred stock bargains for
a particular rate of return and would like to assume continued interest payments
over an extended period of time."'
5. See supra note 3 (indenture contains provisions with respect to rights of security pur-
chaser and security holder); see also supra note 4 (indenture contains obligations of indenture
trustee).
6. See 1 Dawio, FiNNcA. PoLicY OF CoRPoRATtoNs 123 (1953). (Corporate stock classified
usually as common and preferred).
7. See Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 605 (S.D.
Ill. 1978) (prospectus set forth terms of preferred stock contract), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979). A company issuing preferred stock usually amends its articles
of incorporation to include the contractual agreements between the company and the stockholders.
See BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONs 501 (rev. ed. 1946) (redeemable provisions of preferred stock
frequently placed in articles of incorporation to insure public availability of contractual terms).
8. See BALLANT NE, supra note 7, at 618-19 (stock agreements may permit redemption
of preferred shares, but issuing company may not make common stock redeemable at its option).
9. See COMMENTARMS, supra note 1, at 475-76 (describing redemption provisions in deben-
tures as "customary"); BALLANTINE, supra note 7, at 509 (redemption rights of corporations'
preferred shares similar to redemption rights of bonds).
10. COMMNTARIES, supra note 1, at 475 (debenture issuer has no right to redeem debenture
absent specific contractual provisions for redemption); see BALLANrIN, supra note 7, at 509 (prefer-
red stock contract may include right of redemption to enable issuing company to redeem). Unlike
debt securities, preferred stock normally has no maturity date. Id.
11. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 475 (possibility of merger is one of several reasons
why issuing company may reserve privilege of redemption).
12. See id. (inability to redeem high interest loan may affect financial strength of issuing
company adversely).
13. See KENNEDY & LANDAU, supra note 3, at 189 (discussing reasons why investor might
want to prevent company from redeeming). During a period of fluctuating interest rates, a secur-
ity purchaser may want to limit an issuing company's right to redeem so that if interest rates
decline, the company may not redeem the outstanding securities and issue new securities at a
lower rate of interest. Id. Such a redemption would force the investor to reinvest at a lower yield. Id.
14. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 1-2 (investors expect prescribed rate of return).
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Agreements affecting an issuing company's rights to redeem its outstand-
ing securities vary considerably. For example, an issuing company may reserve
unlimited rights of redemption of its securities." Alternatively, security pur-
chasers could include a provision in their agreement with the issuer that the
issuer has no right of redemption for a specific time.' A more common agree-
ment between security holders and issuers, however, is a nonrefunding provi-
sion which provides that the security issuer may not redeem the outstanding
securities with funds borrowed at an interest rate lower than the interest rate
that the issuer initially paid on the security.'I Accordingly, under a nonrefund-
ing provision, the issuer maintains a limited right of redemption through non-
borrowed funds while the security holder receives protection against redemp-
tion if interest rates fall and the issuer wants to redeem the securities and
refinance the debt by issuing securities paying a lower interest rate.' 8
Redemption terms contained in an indenture or stock agreement are con-
tractual and, therefore, courts considering disputes between security holders
and security issuers with respect to redemption provisions generally apply con-
tractual principles to resolve the disputes.' 9 Thus, a company's right to redeem
its outstanding securities will depend on the specific language of the redemp-
tion provision included in the issuer's agreement with the security holder.
20
By redeeming securities, an issuing company may violate the security's redemp-
tion provision, giving rise to a security holder's claim for breach of contract.
2 '
Courts considering whether an issuer's redemption of a security violated the
security's redemption provision initially must examine the language of the
contract.2 2 If the language of a contractual provision is ambiguous, a review-
15. See KENNEDY & LANDAU, supra note 3, at 188 (redemption provision may allow redemp-
tion of debt securities at option of company); BALLANnNE, supra note 7, at 509 (corporation
may reserve right to redeem preferred shares).
16. KENNEDY & LANDAU, supra note 3, at 189 (noncallable provision prohibits issuer from
redeeming security for certain period of time).
17. Id.; see COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 477 (nonrefunding provisions common in in-
denture agreements). The American Bar Foundation Model Debenture Indenture contains sug-
gested language for a nonrefunding provision qualifying a company's option to redeem its securities.
Id. at 483. The Model Debenture Indenture provides that, "... the Company may not, however,
redeem any of the Debentures pursuant to such option prior to . . .directly or indirectly from
or in anticipation of money borrowed having an interest cost to the Company . . .of less than
Id. at 483-84. see infra notes 33, 67, & 99 (nonrefunding provisions focus of litigation).
18. COMMENTARmES, supra note 1, at 477, see supra note 13 (security purchaser desires pro-
tection against redemption during period of fluctuating interest rates).
19. See COMMETrARIES, supra note 1, at 2 (rights of debt security holders are matter of
contract); KENNEDY & LANDAU, supra note 3, at 25 (since trust indenture is contract, courts apply
contractual principles to relationship between debenture holder and issuer); BALLANTINE, supra
note 7, at 501 (rights and privileges set forth in preferred stock contract are contractual).
20. See Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602,. 612-16
(S.D. I1. 1978) (language of stock agreement determined rights of parties), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1109
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
21. See id. (preferred stockholders argued redemption of stock violated stock's nonrefund-
ing provision).
22. Id. at 613.
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ing court may resolve the ambiguity against the drafter of the language."3 An
ambiguity exists when the language of a contract permits more than one
reasonable interpretation.2" Mere disagreement over the meaning of a con-
tractual provision, however, does not evidence an ambiguity.25 When contrac-
tual language is clear, a court must enforce the contract as written.26 A review-
ing court may not change the interpretation of clear contractual language to
agree with the court's sense of equity in a particular case.27 To interpret cor-
rectly contractual language, a reviewing court must examine fully the precise
wording of a contractual provision to give meaning to all of the terms within
the provision. 28 The precise language of redemption provisions in indenture
agreements and stock contracts, therefore, determines the redemption rights
of the issuing company and the security holders.29
The language of a nonrefunding provision in a preferred stock contract
governed the disposition of a breach of contract claim in Franklin Life In-
surance Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co.." In Edison, the plaintiffs3' pur-
chased a portion of the Commonwealth Edison Company's (Edison or Com-
pany) issue of cumulative prior preferred stock.32 A prospectus accompanying
23. See 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 621 (3d ed. 1961) (courts generally interpret contract
language against party drafting language).
24. Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 622 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. App. 1981) (ambiguity present
if court can find more than one reasonable interpretation from contract language).
25. See id. (disagreement between issuing company and bond purchasers over meaning of,
bond provision did not make provision ambiguous).
26. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 947 (5th Cir.) (court must enforce clear
language of contract), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
27. Id. (court may not rewrite contract when language is clear).
28. WILUSTON, supra note 23, at 731; see, e.g., Thomas Hoist Co. v. William J. Newman
Co., 365 Ill. 160, 166, 6 N.E.2d 171, 174 (1937) (court determined meaning of construction con-
tract by giving effect to every clause and word in contract); Yamnitz v. Polytech, Inc., 586 S.W.2d
76, 80 (Mo. App. 1979) (court determined intent of parties to warranty contract by giving mean-
ing to all contractual terms).
29. See Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1542
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (wording of indenture agreement permitted issuing company to redeem deben-
tures); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 603, 613-16 (S.D.
Ill. 1978) (language of stock agreement allowed issuing company to redeem preferred stock). aff'd
598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
30. See Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 613-16
(S.D. 11. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
31. Id. at 604. In Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., the plaintiff Franklin
Life Insurance Company filed suit against the Commonwealth Edison Company (the Company),
individually and as representative of a class of preferred stockholders. Id. The Teacher Retire-
ment System of Texas, purchasers of a significant number of the Company's preferred shares,
later intervened. Id. at 605.
32. Id. Cumulative prior preferred stock is a special type of preferred stock providing that
if the issuing company is unable to make interest payments to the preferred stockholders during
any payment period, the company must pay any unpaid interest in subsequent payment periods
before the company may declare any dividends for common stockholders. See BALLANTINE, supra
note 7, at 505 (preferred stock dividends may be cumulative); DFWnIG, supra note 6, at 137
(cumulative preferred stock implies payment of lapsed interest payments to preferred stockholders
before dividend payments to common stockholders).
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the sale of the preferred stock stated that the issuer could not "redeem through
refunding" the preferred stock by incurring debt if that debt had an interest
cost to the Company less than the interest rate the issuer currently paid to
the holders of the preferred stock. 3 Apart from the limitation of the nonrefund-
ing provision, Edison maintained the option of redeeming any or all of the
outstanding shares of preferred stock at any time, subject to the Company's
payment of a premium to the preferred stockholders in the event of early
redemption. 34 Because of the stock's high rate of interest and relying on the
nonrefunding provision, the plaintiffs purchased the preferred stock." The
preferred stock prospectus also contained an economic forecast for the
Company.", The forecast explained that Edison planned significant borrow-
ings in addition to its preferred stock issuance to finance an expansive con-
struction program." In particular, the Company planned to raise a large por-
tion of the funds needed for its construction program by issuing additional
securities .
3
Edison believed from the time it issued the preferred stock that the language
of the nonrefunding provision did not prohibit the redemption of the preferred
stock from the proceeds of a sale of common stock. 3 Accordingly, within
two years following the sale of the preferred stock, the Company sold common
stock and redeemed the preferred stock."' The plaintiff stockholders sued the
33. See Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 605. The nonrefunding provision in Edison provided that:
Prior to August 1, 1980 [ten years after issuance], none of the 9.44% Prior Preferred
Stock may be redeemed through refunding, directly or indirectly, by or in anticipation
of the incurring of any debt or the issuance of any other stock ranking prior to or
on a parity with the Prior Preferred Stock, if such debt has an interest cost to the
Company (as defined), or such shares have a dividend cost to the Company (as de-
fined), less than the cost to the Company of the 9.44% Prior Preferred Stock.
Id.
34. Id. In Edison, the Company contracted to pay to preferred stockholders a premium
at a varying rate depending on when the Company redeemed the preferred stock. Id. When a
company issuing securities desires to reserve a right to redeem the securities prior to the securities'
maturity date, the company generally must pay a premium for the privilege. See COmmENTARiES,
supra note 1, at 477.
35. Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 605.
36. Id.
37. Id. In the Company's economic forecast, Edison predicted borrowing $2,225,000,000
over a five year period following the issuance of the plaintiffs' preferred stock. Id. The Company
planned to obtain $1,150,000,000 of the debt through the issuance of additional securities. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 606. The Company in Edison believed that its ability to redeem the outstanding
preferred stock through the issuance of common stock did not depend on its plans to borrow
funds for the Company's construction program. Id. A Company witness, an executive in an under-
writing firm, testified at trial that indenture provisions contain nonrefunding provisions to pre-
vent companies from redeeming securities by issuing low-interest bonds and not to restrict a com-
pany's right to redeem outstanding securities through the issuance of common stock. Id. at 609.
40. Id. at 606. Within the year following the sale of the preferred stock, the Company
in Edison held its annual meeting. Id. A proxy statement the Company published for the meeting
contained statements addressing the possibility of the Company redeeming its preferred stock
by issuing common stock. Id. In the proxy statement, however, the Company declared that it
had no definite plans to make a redemption at the time of the proxy statement. Id. Additionally,
19841
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Company claiming that the redemption of the preferred stock with the pro-
ceeds of a sale of common stock violated the preferred stock contract's
nonrefunding provision."' The plaintiffs believed that the nonrefunding pro-
at Edison's annual stockholders' meeting a Company spokesman stated that the Company plan-
ned to refund the outstanding preferred stock. Id. One year later, the company issued common
stock and redeemed the preferred stock. Id.
41. Id. at 604. In addition to the breach of contract claim in Edison, the plaintiffs alleged
that the Company violated §§ I1 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. See 15 U.S.C. §§
77k, 77q (1982). The plaintiffs also claimed that the Company violated § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, when the Company sold and re-
deemed the preferred stock. Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 604, 607; see 15 USC § 78j(b) (1982) (§ 10(b)
of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) (text of rule lOb-5).
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that a reading of the redemption provision contained in the
prospectus accompanying the stock sale, in conjunction with Edison's forecast of additional bor-
rowing to finance construction, gave the plaintiffs the impression that the Company could not
redeem the preferred stock for a 10 year period following the stock's issuance. 451 F. Supp.
at 606. The plaintiffs in Edison argued that the Company should have disclosed to investors,
before the preferred stock issuance, both the Company's belief that it could redeem its preferred
stock by issuing common stock and the Company's plan to redeem the preferred stock when
economically feasible. Id. at 607. Because the Company failed to disclose its redemption inten-
tions before the preferred stock's issuance, the plaintiffs argued that the Company misled the
stockholder in violation of the federal securities laws by failing to clarify the Company's understand-
ing of the redemption terms to the preferred stockholders. See id. The plaintiffs also contended
that following the preferred stock's issuance, the defendant knew that the stockholders and the
general investment community did not realize that the Company believed it could redeem its preferred
stock by issuing common stock. Id. at 610. Since the Company continued to fail to disclose to
the public its redemption intentions after the preferred stock's issuance, the plaintiffs argued
that the Company recklessly failed to disclose material information and schemed to defraud the
stockholders in violation of rule lob-5. Id. at 610 n. 10.
Although the plaintiffs in Edison alleged several securities laws claims, the Edison court
examined only those allegations under rule lOb-5 promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 607. The court reasoned that §§ 11 and 17 of the Securities Act
of 1933 either were coterminous with rule lOb-5 or provided a stricter standard for recovery than
under rule lOb-5 so that a rejection of plaintiffs' rule 10b-5 claim necessarily would dispose of
the other securities claims. See id. at 607 n. 1.; 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (§ 11 of Securities Act
of 1933 providing civil liability for false registration statement); § 77q (§ 17 of Securities Act
of 1933 prohibiting fraudulent offer or sale of security through instrumentalities of interstate
commerce); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) (rule lOb-5).
The Edison court separately considered the plaintiffs' rule lOb-5 claims with respect to the
Company's duty to disclose its redemption intentions both before and after the preferred stock's
issuance. 451 F. Supp. at 607. Initially, the court considered the plaintiffs' claim that the defend-
ant should have disclosed, at the time of issuance, its beliefs regarding the preferred stock's redemp-
tion provision. Id. at 608. Although the court doubted that the Company had a duty to disclose
the Company's opinions and beliefs under rule lOb-5, the court determined that the Company,
in failing to disclose its beliefs concerning its redemption rights, had not acted with the requisite
intent to deceive under rule 10b-5. Id. at 609; see Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
193 n.12 (1976) (defendant must act with scienter, which is "mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud" under rule 10b-5). The Edison court next addressed the plain-
tiffs' claim that the defendant learned after the preferred stock's issuance that the investment
community and the plaintiffs were not aware of the defendant's plans to redeem and yet the
Company still failed to disclose the redemption information. 451 F. Supp. at 609. The court
determined that a Company proxy statement and a statement that a Company vice-president made
at the Company's annual meeting were adequate to meet the Company's duty to disclose material
information regarding its securities. See id. at 610-11.
As the holding in Edison exemplifies, a security holder seeking to establish that an issuing
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vision, coupled with the Company's plans for significant borrowings to finance
its construction program, prohibited the Company from redeeming the pre-
ferred stock. 2 The plaintiffs reasoned that as long as Edison was a "net bor-
rower," borrowing more funds than it repaid, any redemption of the preferred
stock would be "in anticipation of" incurring new debt having a lower in-
terest rate than the rate the Company currently paid on the preferred stock.
' 3
Since Edison planned to borrow extensively for its construction program, it
would have to replace the funds it used to redeem the preferred stock with
additional funds that the Company could borrow at a lower interest rate."
The plaintiffs argued, therefore, that Edison's redemption of the outstanding
preferred stock through the issuance of common stock violated the preferred
stock contract's nonrefunding provision."
Edison argued that the preferred stock's nonrefunding provision stated
only that the Company could not redeem the preferred stock "through
refunding. 4 , 6 Edison contended that this language prohibited the redemption
of the preferred stock through low-cost borrowing, but did not prohibit the
redemption of the preferred stock through the sale of common stock. 7 Edison
reasoned that the issuance of common stock is not a refunding operation and
that the preferred stock contract's redemption provision only prohibited the
redemption of the preferred stock through refunding. 8
To resolve the contract dispute, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois examined the language of the preferred stock con-
tract's nonrefunding provision. 9 Because a court construing a contract must
try to give meaning to all of the contractual terms, the Edison court closely
examined the language of the nonrefunding provision which provided that
the Company could not redeem the preferred stock "through refunding.'"1
company violated federal securities laws must establish that the company did not make an ade-
quate disclosure and that even if the disclosure was inadequate, the issuing company acted with
scienter. See id. at 608-09. Thus, any securities law claims that a security holder may have against
a company redeeming securities will depend on what disclosures the company made and a factual
determination of whether the issuing company acted with scienter in failing to disclose information.
42. 451 F. Supp. at 606. The plaintiff in Edison reasoned the prohibition on the redemp-
tion of the preferred stock extended to August 1, 1980, ten years after the preferred stock's is-
suance. See id.; supra note 33 (language of preferred stock's nonrefunding provision).
43. See 451 F. Supp. at 608.
44. See id. To finance a part of its construction, the Company in Edison issued short and
long-term debt instruments at an interest rate of less than the interest rate payable on the prefer-
red stock. Id. at 606.
45. See id. at 612-13. The plaintiffs in Edison argued that the sale of common stock was
"in anticipation of" incurring new debt and, therefore, violated the preferred stock contract's
nonrefunding provision because the Company could foresee borrowing funds at a lower interest
rate than the rate payable on the preferred shares. See id.; supra note 33 (containing language
of nonrefunding provision).
46. See 451 F. Supp. at 613-14.
47. See id.
48. See id. The Company in Edison reasoned that refunding involves incurring new debt
to repay old debt, so that the issuance of common stock, involving the sale of an equitable in-
terest in the corporation, would not constitute refunding. See id.
49. See id. at 612-15; supra note 33 (text of nonrefunding provisions).
50. See 451 F. Supp. at 613-15.
1984]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
The court reasoned that this limiting language prohibited the Company's prefer-
red stock redemption only if the Company obtained the funds necessary for
the redemption through a refunding operation by which the Company incur-
red debt.' The Edison court agreed with the Company's conclusion that ob-
taining funds through a sale of common stock was equity financing, not a
refunding operation, and, therefore, redeeming the preferred stock with the
proceeds of a common stock sale did not violate the preferred stock's
nonrefunding provision.-
2
The Edison court's holding may be significant to preferred stockholders
faced with an issuing company's pending redemption of outstanding prefer-
red shares. The stockholder must realize that, as the Edison court empha-
sized, an issuing company's right to redeem outstanding preferred stock depends
on the language of the stock contract's redemption provision." The Edison
court based its decision that the Company could redeem its preferred stock
through the proceeds of a common stock sale to a large extent on the "through
refunding" language of the preferred stock contract." ' The court added,
however, that if the redemption provision had not contained the "through
refunding" language, the plaintiffs' "net borrower" argument would have
been persuasive."
A preferred stockholder, confronted by an issuing company wishing to
redeem the stock by issuing common stock, could argue that unless the
nonrefunding provision in the stock agreement contains the "through refund-
ing" language found in the agreement in Edison, then the issuing company
who is a net borrower of funds, may not redeem the preferred stock by issu-
ing common stock. 6 Accordingly, the stockholders could argue, like the
51. See id. at 614. The Edison court found support for its reasoning that the nonrefunding
provision only prohibited a redemption of the plaintiffs' preferred stock if the Company obtain-
ed the funds through a refunding operation in the language of the preferred stock's prospectus
which stated that the preferred stock was not redeemable "through certain refunding operations."
Id. at 615. The court held that the nonrefunding provision only restricted the source of funds
that the Company could use to redeem the preferred shares to funds that the Company obtained
from a "refunding operation." Id. at 614. Additionally, the court noted that the preferred stock's
redemption provision set a redemption price of $110 a share if the Company redeemed the stock
prior to August 1, 1980. Id. at 615. The court reasoned, therefore, that this redemption price
evidenced the Company's belief that it could redeem the preferred stock prior to August 1, 1980. Id.
52. See id. at 616.
53. Id. at 613.
54. See id. at 613-16; supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text ("through refunding" language
allowed Edison to redeem preferred stock through common stock sale).
55. 451 F. Supp. at 614. The Edison court believed that a distinction existed between redemp-
tion in anticipation of debt and redemption through refunding in anticipation of debt. Id. If
the redemption provision had not contained the "through refunding" language, then the nonrefund-
ing provision might have prohibited the Company's redemption of its preferred stock with the
proceeds of a common stock sale because the redemption would have been in anticipation of
new debt. Id. The court suggested that the preferred stock's nonrefunding provision without the
"through refunding" language would have barred redemption when the Company anticipated
incurring new low-interest debt. See id. The actual redemption provision only prohibited redemp-
tion in anticipation of debt if that redemption was "through refunding." See id. at 614-15.
56. See id. A security holder faced with redemption also could attempt to distinguish Edison
on the particular facts of the case. The Edison court stated that it interpreted the preferred stock
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stockholders in Edison, that if a company plans significant borrowing, redeem-
ing the preferred stock through the proceeds of a common stock sale would
be in anticipation of incurring new debt because the company would have
to replace the funds that the company would use to redeem the preferred stock
with other funds that the issuing company may borrow at a lower interest
rate." Furthermore, the stockholder could argue that nonrefunding provisions
should prevent an issuing company from redeeming outstanding securities
through low interest borrowing if interest rates decline.58 A stockholder could
contend that allowing redemption with the proceeds of a common stock sale
when the issuing company may replace the funds that the company used to
contract's nonrefunding provision to prohibit redemption only with funds obtained through a
refunding operation not merely because the stock contract contained the language "redeemed
through refunding" but also because other language in the preferred stock prospectus stated that
the stock was not redeemable "through certain refunding operations." See id. at 615. The court
reasoned that this language limited the method the Company could use to redeem the preferred
stock. See id. The court further reasoned, however, that this language indicated that the Com-
pany considered redemption of the preferred stock prior to 1980 a definite possibility as long
as the method of redemption was not a refunding operation that violated the preferred stock
contract's nonrefunding provision. See id. Additionally, the court realized that the plaintiffs'
interpretation of the nonrefunding provisions only made the stock redeemable out of funds with
an interest rate greater than the rate currently paid on the preferred stock, or if the Company
ceased to be a net borrower of funds so that a redemption would not be in anticipation of incurr-
ing new debt. See id. The Company could not cease to be a net borrower of funds, however,
unless it ended its plans for construction and expansion. See id. Since the Company would not
borrow high interest money to redeem the preferred stock and undoubtedly would continue its
construction program, the court felt the plaintiffs' interpretation of the nonrefunding provision
made the stock uncallable for 10 years after issuance. Id. The court reasoned that if the Company
had intended the preferred stock to be uncallable, the Company would have drafted a nonrefunding
provision to that effect. See id.
The Edison court analyzed the nonrefunding provision considering that since the Company
was a public utility, the Company would have to be a net borrower of funds to finance construc-
tion necessary to meet a growing demand for power. See id. Several other cases resolving disputes
over nonrefunding provisions also have involved public utility companies, which because of a
demand for continuous construction, traditionally are net borrowers of funds. See, e.g., John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., Civil No. 80-6960 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
21, 1982) (available on Laxis, Genfed Library, Dist. file) (public utility company allowed to redeem
bonds under language of nonrefunding provision in indenture agreement); Harris v. Union Elec.
Co., 622 S.W.2d 239, 248-50 (Mo. App. 1981) (public utility company allowed to redeem bonds
under language of nonrefunding provision in indenture agreement). A holder of securities in a
company other than a public utility might distinguish Edison, therefore, by arguing that while
high fixed capital costs may assure that a public utility company will be a net borrower of funds,
other corporations issuing preferred stock will not be necessarily net borrowers of funds. In-
vestors in unregulated companies, unlike investors in a public utility company, could not expect,
in most cases, the issuing company to be a net borrower of funds during the period that the
nonrefunding provision is in effect. Therefore, if an issuing company other than a public utility
includes a nonrefunding provision, similar to the provision in Edison, in a preferred stock con-
tract and seeks to redeem the preferred stock by issuing common stock, the reviewing court should
not allow the redemption if the company is a net borrower of funds because the redemption
would be "in anticipation of" incurring new debt.
57. See 451 F. Supp. at 613-14.
58. See supra note 13 (nonrefunding provisions included in security agreement to prevent
redemption by low interest money during periods of declining interest rates).
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redeem the stock with low interest borrowed funds controverts the purpose
underlying nonrefunding provision. 9
The issuing company, on the other hand, my claim, as the defendant com-
pany in Edison claimed, that nonrefunding provisions similar to the provision
used in Edison prevent a company from redeeming outstanding preferred stock
through low-cost borrowings, but not through the proceeds of a common stock
sale.6" Accordingly, the company might contend that any nonrefunding provi-
sion containing language similar to that in Edison assumes that the redemp-
tion of the preferred stock may not be "through refunding" whether or not
the redemption provision contains that exact language.,' Furthermore, an is-
suing company could insist that any policy underlying nonrefunding provi-
sions in general is not relevant. The right of the issuing company to redeem
the company's preferred stock depends solely on the stock contract.62 Therefore,
if the language of the stock contract permits an issuing company to redeem
its preferred stock, then the court must enforce the language of the contract
and allow the company to redeem the stock.
63
In determining the rights of debt security holders under an indenture agree-
ment, reviewing courts generally apply the same contractual analysis to the
indenture agreement as the Edison court used in examining the preferred stock
contract. 61 Similar to the redemption provision in Edison, an indenture agree-
ment's redemption provision may allow the issuing company to redeem debt
securities against the wishes and expectation of the security holders. 65 For ex-
ample, in Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,66 the Archer
59. See id.
60. See 451 F. Supp. at 609; COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 477 (standard nonrefunding
provisions recognize that issuing company may obtain funds from sources other than borrowing
to redeem securities); KENNEDY & LANDAU, supra note 3, at 189 (nonrefunding provisions pre-
vent redemption from low-interest borrowed funds).
61. See KENNEDY & LANDAU, supra note 3, at 188 (refunding involves issuance of debt
securities); see also supra note 17 (language of model nonrefunding provision states that issuing
company may not redeem securities with funds borrowed or obtained in anticipation of borrowing).
62. See Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 613; supra text accompanying notes 19-29 (disputes over
redemption provisions are matters of contract). If a company issuing securities under a nonrefund-
ing provision that does not contain Edison's "through refunding" language argues that redemp-
tion rights are solely dependent on the stock contract, then a reviewing court may conclude that
the company may not redeem its outstanding stock with the proceeds of a common stock is-
suance. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (absent "through refunding" language,
issuing company arguably could not redeem securities from common stock sale if company con-
temporaneously is net borrower of funds).
63. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (court must enforce clear language of
contract).
64. See KENNEDY & LANDAU, supra note 3, at 25 (since indenture is contract, courts apply
contractual principles to analyze indenture).
65. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., Civil No. 80-6960
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1982) (available on LExis, Genfed Library, Dist. File) (bond redemption allowed
through use of special funds that indenture established); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 622 S.W.2d
239 242-43 (Mo. App. 1981) (indenture created special funds that issuing company used to redeem
bonds).
66. 570 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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Daniels Midland Company (Archer Daniels) issued debentures under an in-
denture agreement containing a nonrefunding provision similar to the
nonrefunding provision in the preferred stock contract in Edison.6 7 The plain-
tiff, the Morgan Stanley & Company, Inc., (Morgan Stanley) purchased some
of the debentures believing that the indenture agreement's nonrefunding pro-
vision provided protection from premature redemption.68 Following the deben-
ture issuance, Archer Daniels borrowed extensively by issuing debt securities
paying an interest rate lower than the interest rate that it paid on the
debentures. 69 Archer Daniels also raised significant capital by issuing com-
mon stock"' and thereafter sought to use the funds that it obtained by issuing
common stock to redeem the outstanding debentures.
7'
Morgan Stanley brought an action claiming that the proposed redemp-
tion violated the nonrefunding provision of the indenture agreement. 2 Similar
67. See id. at 1539. In Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., the indenture
agreement between the debenture issuer, the Archer Daniels Midland Company, and Morgan
Stanley & Company, provided that:
The Debentures may be redeemed, .. , at the election of the Company, as a whole
or from time to time in part, at any time, subject to the conditions and at the Redemp-
tion Prices specified in the second paragraph on the reverse side of the form of Deben-
ture hereinbefore set forth; provided, however, that prior to May 15, 1991, the Com-
pany may not redeem any of the Debentures pursuant to such option from the pro-
ceeds, or in anticipation, of the issuance of any indebtedness for money borrowed by
or for the account of the Company.... if... the interest cost ... shall be less
than 16.08% per annum.
Id. at 1531 n. 1.
A prospectus announcing the debentures' issuance provided that the issuing company could
not redeem the debentures "as part of a refunding or as part of a refunding operation by the
application, directly or indirectly, of the proceeds of indebtedness for money borrowed which
shall have an interest cost of less than 16.08% per annum." Id. n. 1.
68. See id. at 1533.
69. See id. at 1532. The issuing company in Morgan Stanley issued debt securities in May
1982, one year following the issuance of the debentures, and issued additional securities in March,
1983. Id. at 1530-31. There was a question whether the March 1983 securities were debt instruments,
but the Morgan Stanley court assumed, for purposes of resolving the plaintiff's application for
preliminary injunctive relief, that Archer Daniels' issuance of the securities resulted in the incurr-
ing of debt. See id. at 1532.
70. Id. at 1532. The issuing company in Morgan Stanley raised funds through two common
stock offerings subsequent to the issuance of its debentures. Id.
71. Id. In Morgan Stanley, Archer Daniels deposited the proceeds of the common stock
sales with the indenture trustee, the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. Id. The trustee placed
the funds in a special account to redeem the debentures. Id. The proceeds of the common stock
sale were sufficient to redeem the debentures. Id.
72. Id. In addition to its claims for breach of contract, the plaintiff debenture holder in
Morgan Stanley asserted that Archer Daniels violated federal and state securities laws similar
to claims that the preferred stockholders made in Edison. See id. at 1532-33; supra note 41 (ex-
plaining Edison court's disposition of preferred stockholders' security claims). The court refused
to grant the plaintiff preliminary injunctive relief on the basis of the securities claims and also
denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the securities claims. See 570 F. Supp.
at 1538, 1542-43 (ruling plaintiff failed to show sufficient likelihood of success on merits to entire
plaintiff to preliminary injunctive relief and order denying Morgan Stanley's motion for sum-
mary judgment on securities claim).
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to the plaintiff's argument in Edison, Morgan Stanley argued that because
of Archer Daniels' significant low-cost borrowing, Archer Daniels' planned
redemption of the debentures would be from funds that Archer Daniels ob-
tained in anticipation of incurring debt bearing an interest rate less than the
rate that Archer Daniels currently paid on the debentures.7 3 Morgan Stanley
believed that Archer Daniels' issuance of low-interest debt securities near the
time of the redemption call proved that the funds for the redemption, at least
indirectly, came from incurring low-cost debt in violation of the terms of the
indenture agreement.7" The plaintiff reasoned that Archer Daniels' proposed
use of funds that it obtained by issuing common stock to redeem the deben-
tures constituted a "juggling of funds" that Archer Daniels used to circum-
vent the indenture agreement's restrictions on debenture redemptions. 75 Morgan
Stanley argued, as did the plaintiffs in Edison, that the court should not allow
a company issuing securities under a nonrefunding provision prohibiting
redemption from low cost borrowing, to redeem its outstanding securities from
the proceeds of a common stock sale when the issuer contemporaneously bor-
rows funds at a lower rate of interest than the rate the issuer currently pays
on the outstanding security.
76
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied the plaintiff's application for preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin
Archer Daniels from redeeming the debentures, ruling that Morgan Stanley
failed to prove a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to entitle the
plaintiff to preliminary relief.7 7 The court subsequently granted Archer Daniels'




77. See id. The Morgan Stanley court based its denial of the plaintiff's application for
preliminary injunctive relief on three considerations. First, the court noted that in Edison, the
only decision addressing the issue of the redemption of a security from the proceeds of a sale
of common stock, the court construed the language of a similar nonrefunding provision to allow
the issuing company to redeem. See id. at 1534-35. Second, the court observed that the redemp-
tion provision in Morgan Stanley was the same as the American Bar Foundation's suggested
Model Debenture Indenture language. See id. at 1535. CoawNr Tagms, supra note 1 at 483.
(American Bar Foundation suggested Model Debenture Indenture language). The court noted
that the Commentaries to the Model Debenture Indenture provisions state that the suggested
nonrefunding provision may allow an issuing company to redeem its securities if it obtains funds
from sources other than through borrowing. 570 F. Supp. at 1535; See COMMENTARIES, supra
note 1, at 477 (funds issuing company obtains from sources other than through borrowing may
be used to redeem securities under nonrefunding provision). Finally, the Morgan Stanley court
noted that the restrictive language of the nonrefunding provision in the indenture agreement followed
broad language granting Archer Daniels a right to redeem its debentures. See 570 F. Supp. at
1535. The redemption provision in Morgan Stanley also contained a table of redemption prices
that Archer Daniels would pay to the debenture holders if Archer Daniels redeemed the deben-
tures. Id. at 1531. This table covered the years that the nonrefunding prohibition would be in
effect. See id. at 1535. The court reasoned that this language supported Archer Daniels' view
that Archer Daniels could redeem the debentures while the nonrefunding provision was operative
if it did not fund the redemption by or in anticipation of incurring indebtedness. See id.
Interestingly, the plaintiff in Morgan Stanley did not argue that once a company issuing
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motion for summary judgment with respect to the contract claim."8 The court
noted that the language of the indenture agreement's nonrefunding provision
was contractual and recognized that reviewing courts should construe language
in indenture agreements according to contract principles.79 While the court
noted that the language of the indenture agreement's nonrefunding provision
was "virtually identical" to the language of the preferred stock contract in
Edison, the court held that the language was ambiguous.80 Morgan Stanley
argued that generally a reviewing court will resolve ambiguities in contract
language against the drafter of the language." The plaintiff also contended
that a reviewing court should attempt to construe all the terms of a contract
according to the "plain meaning" of the terms.8" The court found, however,
that these general principles of contract construction did not aid in resolving
the dispute with respect to the indenture agreement's nonrefunding provision.
3
The court reasoned that the nonrefunding provision's language had no clear
"plain meaning." 8 ' Additionally, through the contractual language was am-
biguous, the court refused to construe the contract against Archer Daniels,
the drafter of the language." Since sophisticated bond counsel for both the
securities under a nonrefunding provision borrows funds at a low rate of interest, then the com-
pany never may redeem the securities through equity funding. See id. The plaintiff instead sug-
gested that a court reviewing the proposed redemption should consider the magnitude of the
debt issuance and its proximity in time relative to the security's redemption call to determine
if the issuing company, though it claims to redeem from equity funding, is funding the redemp-
tion, at least indirectly, by incurring debt. Id. The court reasoned that a case-by-case approach
to determine the legality of a redemption transaction would present difficulties for reviewing
courts and security holders. Id. at 1535-36. The court noted that under a case-by-case approach,
a reviewing court would have to declare a redemption transaction unlawful merely if the issuing
company appeared to fund the redemption through low-cost borrowing. Id. at 1536. Additionally,
the court argued that such an approach would leave investors uncertain with respect to when
a company could redeem its securities. Id.
78. Id. at 1542-43.
79. See id. at 1538-39; supra note 64 (reviewing courts generally apply contractual prin-
ciples to resolve disputes with respect to indenture agreement provisions).
80. See 570 F. Supp. at 1541. While the redemption provision in the indenture agreement
in Morgan Stanley did not contain the "through refunding" language, the prospectus announc-
ing the debenture sale stated that Archer Daniels could not redeem the debentures "as part of
a refunding or as part of a refunding operation" through low-cost borrowing. See id.; supra
note 67 (text of indenture agreement and prospectus).
81. 570 F. Supp. at 1542; See Prescott, Ball and Turben v. LTV Corp. 531 F. Supp. 213,
218 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (New York follows basic rule that reviewing court must resolve ambiguities
in contract against party which drafted the agreement).
82. See 570 F. Supp. at 1542.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 1540-41. The Morgan Stanley court reasoned that both the plaintiff's and
Archer Daniels' interpretation of the nonrefunding provisions language diluted the meaning of
some of the contractual language. See id. at 1541. Archer Daniels' interpretation did not give
full effect to the "indirectly or directly" "in anticipation of language" in the security agreement.
Id. Morgan Stanley's interpretation of the nonrefunding agreement did not take notice of the
"from the proceeds" and "as part of a refunding operation" language. Id.; see supra note 67
(nonrefunding language of indenture and prospectus).
85. See 570 F. Supp. at 1542.
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underwriters and the issuing company negotiated the indenture terms, the court
reasoned that no disparate bargaining power existed between the parties and,
therefore, the court could not construe appropriately the contractual language
against the drafter. 86 The court accordingly looked to the decision in Edison
to resolve the contract dispute."7 The court in Morgan Stanley found that the
contractual analysis and reasoning in Edison was convincing with respect to
the meaning of the nonrefunding provision and, therefore, granted Archer
Daniels' motion for summary judgment." The court emphasized that since
the Edison decision preceded Archer Daniels' debenture issuance by several
years, bond counsel for all of the parties should have been aware of the ruling
in Edison in drafting the indenture agreement's nonrefunding provision. 9
The holding in Morgan Stanley granting Archer Daniels' motion for sum-
mary judgment, thereby allowing Archer Daniels to redeem its debentures from
the proceeds of a sale of common stock, supports but may not extend the
holding in Edison. The language of the prospectus accompanying the deben-
ture issuance in Morgan Stanley, as in the prospectus of the preferred stock
issuance in Edison, contained language prohibiting redemption "through
refunding." 90 Thus, a security holder whose security agreement does not in-
clude the "through refunding" language may still argue that the agreement
between the security issuer and the security holder does not allow the issuing
company to redeem the outstanding security with the proceeds of a common
stock sale when the company contemporaneously borrows low-cost funds.9 '
86. See id. at 1541. The court in Morgan Stanley agreed that under the circumstances of
the case in which the underwriters actively negotiated the terms of the indenture agreement, the
underwriter and, therefore, arguably the debenture purchasers, drafted the redemption provi-
sion's language. See id. at 1541-42; Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 947 n.20 (5th
Cir.) (en banc) (debenture purchaser may stand in shoes of debenture underwriter who negotiated
and drafted debentures), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
87. See Morgan Stanley, 570 F. Supp. at 1541-42.
88. See id. at 1542. Illinois law governed the Edison decision and therefore, was not bind-
ing on the Morgan Stanley court, a federal court sitting in New York and applying New York's
substantive law. Id. The Morgan Stanley court emphasized, however, that the Edison case was
the only case addressing this nonrefunding provision issue, and that the Edison court resolved
the dispute by applying universal contract principles. Id. at 1533-34, 1540. The court concluded
that the Edison holding predictably should affect a decision in Morgan Stanley. Id. at 1541-42.
89. See id. at 1541. The Morgan Stanley court noted that actual unawareness of the Edison
decision was irrelevant, since a contract automatically includes the law existing at the time of
the contract's formation. Id.; see infra note 92 (New York law "presumes" parties had knowledge
of law existing at time of contract's creation).
90. See 570 F. Supp. at 1535; compare supra note 33 (nonrefunding provision in Edison)
with supra note 67 (nonrefunding provision in Morgan Stanley).
91. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (absent "through refunding" language,
security holders' net borrower theory may be persuasive). A security holder faced with a redemp-
tion of his securities through equity financing may note that in Edison and Morgan Stanley,
the "through refunding" language appeared only in the prospectus accompanying the security's
issuance. See supra note 33 ("through refunding" language in prospectus in Edison); supra note
67 ("through refunding" language in prospectus in Morgan Stanley). The reviewing court in each
case regarded the prospectus language as a part of the security agreement between the issuing
company and the security holder. See Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 613 (redemption terms of preferred
stock issue part of preferred stock contract). Morgan Stanley, 570 F. Supp. at 1542. ("through
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If the security agreement does contain the "through refunding" language, then
it seems clear that the issuing company may redeem the outstanding securities
from the proceeds of a sale of common stock 2 or from other equity financing.93
The nonrefunding provision still would protect the security holders from a
redemption with funds that the issuing company obtains from low-interest
borrowing. 4 Thus, the security issuer's right to redeem its securities may de-
pend on the precise language of the security's indenture agreement.9 "
Another case in which the precise language of a nonrefunding provision
determined the rights of an issuing company to redeem its securities was Har-
ris v. Union Electric Co.96 In Harris, the defendant company issued mortgage
bonds under an indenture. 97 The indenture stated that the issuer could not
redeem the bonds before maturity, other than through the use of two special
funds,9" with money that the issuer would borrow at an interest rate lower
refunding" language of prospectus part of security agreement). If the "through refunding" language
appears only in the prospectus accompanying the original security issue, however, later purchasers
of the security would not know that the issuing company could redeem the securities by issuing
common stock. Subsequent purchasers of the securities could argue that the security certificate
did not contain the "through refunding" language, and thus the issuing company should not
be permitted to redeem the securities through a common stock sale. See supra notes 55-57 (absent
"through refunding" language in security agreement, issuing company may not be able to redeem
securities through common stock sale).
92. See Morgan Stanley, 570 F. Supp. at 1542. Since both the Morgan Stanley and Edison
decision allowed the issuing company to redeem their respective securities from a common stock
sale despite the security agreements' nonrefunding provisions, reviewing courts resolving future
disputes over nonrefunding provisions may also allow redemption reasoning that the negotiators
of the security agreements' nonrefunding provisions should have been aware of the prior case
law. See Skandia Amer. Reinsurance Corp. v. Schenck, 441 F. Supp. 715, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(under New York law, court presumes parties contemplated relevant law in drafting contract).
93. See Morgan Stanley, 570 F. Supp. at 1532 . (issuing company may use cash reserves
or funds that it obtains from sale of assets, in addition to proceeds of sale of common stock,
to redeem securities).
94. See id. at 1535. The Morgan Stanley court added that the reviewing court must be
certain that the funds the issuer uses to redeem outstanding securities, even if the issuer obtains
the funds by issuing common stock, do not come indirectly from incurring indebtedness. See
id. at 1542 nA. Thus, the court indicated that the court might not allow an issuing company
to redeem outstanding securities from a common stock sale and subsequently incur low-cost in-
debtedness to repurchase the common stock. Id. The court reasoned that in such a case the issu-
ing company arguably would have redeemed the stock in anticipation of incurring debt. Id. In
Morgan Stanley, there were no allegations that Archer Daniels planned to repurchase the com-
mon stock that it had used to finance the debentures' redemption. Id. at 1532-33.
95. See id. at 1542.
96. 622 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. App. 1981).
97. Id. at 241.
98. See id. at 242-44. The issuing company in Harris v. Union Elec. Co. tried to redeem
bonds that it had issued in 1975 under an indenture agreement that supplemented the bond inden-
ture agreement of 1937. Id. at 241-42. The 1975 indenture established an Improvement Fund
under which the issuing company had to pay cash to a trustee annually or satisfy the cash pay-
ment requirement with property addition credits. Id. at 243. The supplemental indenture stated
that the trustee should use any cash that the company paid to the trustee to redeem the outstand-
ing bonds at a special redemption price equal to the par value of the bond plus accrued interest.
Id. Unlike the Improvement Fund, previous supplemental indentures to the original indenture
of 1937 had established a Maintenance Fund. Id. As with the Improvement Fund, however, the
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than the interest rate payable on the bonds."' The defendant company plan-
ned to borrow money at a low interest rate, place that money in the two special
funds, and use the special funds to redeem the bonds.100 The bondholders
argued that the indenture agreement's redemption provision prohibited redemp-
tion from low-interest borrowed funds deposited into the special funds.'"0 The
bondholders sought injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the bond issuer's
redemption plans."0 2 The Missouri Court of Appeals studied the language of
the indenture agreement's redemption provision and concluded that the pro-
hibition on bond redemptions did not apply to redemptions through the special
fund even if the company borrowed money at a low interest rate to deposit
into the funds.10 3
company had to pay cash into the Maintenance Fund or use property addition credits. Id. at
244. The 1975 supplemental indenture continued the Maintenance Fund and stated that any cash
that the company paid into the Maintenance Fund constituted part of the trust estate. Id. The
1975 indenture provided that the company could use cash in the trust estate to redeem outstand-
ing bonds and that such a redemption would be at the special redemption price. Id.
99. See id. at 242-43. The nonrefunding provision in the supplemental indenture agreement
in Harris provided that
• . . Bonds . . . shall not be redeemable at the option of the Company at any time
prior to March 1, 1985 (other than by the operation of the Improvement Fund or the
Maintenance Fund provided in Article IV of this Supplemental Indenture or pursuant
to Section 8 [allowing redemption from funds in trust estate] of Article VIII of the
Original Indenture) if moneys for such redemption are obtained by the company directly
or indirectly from or in anticipation of borrowings by or for the account of the Com-
pany at an effective interest cost . . . of 10.60% per annum.
Id. at 242-43.
100. Id. at 242. The issuing company in Harris made short-term borrowings of funds at
less than 10.6% to deposit into the special funds to redeem the outstanding bonds. Id. The issu-
ing company planned to issue a new series of bonds at 10.35% to replace the borrowed funds.
Id. When the plaintiff bondholders filed suit against the issuing company to prevent redemption,
the company withdrew the cash from the Maintenance and Improvement Funds and replaced
it with property credits. Id.
101. See id. at 243.
102. Id. at 242.
103. See id. at 251. The trial court in Harris had granted the plaintiff bondholders' motion
for summary judgment holding that the company could use neither the Improvement Fund nor
the Maintenance Fund to redeem generally its outstanding bonds. See id. at 244. The trial court
reasoned that the bonds' nonrefunding provision prevented redemption of the bonds from low-
interest borrowings at a cost of less than 10.607. Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals held, however,
that the language of the nonrefunding provisions unambiguously allowed redemption of the bonds
from Improvement Fund cash or from cash deposited with the trustee, as part of the trustee's
estate, to satisfy l.m Maintenance Fund. Id. at 251. Furthermore, the issuing company could
use cash held as part of the trustee's estate to redeem at the "special redemption price" of the
par value of bonds plus accrued interest. See id.
Like the Harris court, other courts have recognized the possibility of redeeming bonds through
the use of special funds. See, e.g., Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 679 (1962)
(issuer could deposit idle cash into maintenance fund and redeem bonds); John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., Civil No. 80-6960 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1982) (available
on LExis, Genfed Library, Dist. File) (issuing Company could deposit low interest cash into special
funds to redeem bonds); Gourielli v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1961) (possibility
that issuing company could redeem outstanding bonds with cash deposited into special funds
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The holdings in Edison, Morgan Stanley, and Harris allowing companies
with outstanding securities to redeem those securities and thereby frustrate
the expectations of the security holders' 4 evidence the difficulties a security
holder faces in trying to prove that an issuing company's redemption of
securities breaches the contract between the security holder and the security
issuer. If the language of a security's redemption provision is not ambiguous,
a reviewing court must enforce the clear language of the provision.'"5 Even
if a provision's language arguable is ambiguous, a court construing a contract
to give meaning to all the terms of a redemption provision, may allow the
issuer to redeem its securities if the company follows the proper procedure.',06
More specifically, if a nonrefunding provision prohibits the redemption of
securities "through refunding" in anticipation of debt, then the issuer still
may redeem its securities from an equity financing even if the company con-
temporaneously borrows significant low-interest funds.'0I Because a security
issuer's right to redeem its outstanding securities may depend on the precise
language of its redemption agreement with the security holders, issuers wishing
to reserve the right of redemption must draft redemption or nonrefunding
provisions with care.0I Similarly, underwriters and security purchasers should
examine a security's redemption provision, in light of existing law, to be cer-
tain they understand under what circumstances the issuer may redeem the
securities. "I
In addition to simple breach of contract claims, a security holder faced
with a redemption may raise several other arguments in contract to prevent
redemption." 0 For example, the security holder could argue that a security
affected tax rate); Parnell v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 576, 577 (M.D. Tenn. 1958) (redemp-
tion provisions allowing bond redemption from special funds are customary), aff'd, 272 F.2d
943 (6th Cir. 1959).
104. See Morgan Stanley, 570 F. Supp. at 1533 (plaintiff believed nonrefunding provision
provided protection from premature redemption); Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 606 (plaintiffs be-
lieved nonrefunding provision made stock nonredeemable for 10 years following issuance); Har-
ris, 622 S.W.2d at 248 (plaintiff bondholders felt nonrefunding provision in mortgage indenture
afforded full protection against low-interest refunding of bonds).
105. See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 947 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
965 (1981) (court must enforce clear language of contract); see also Harris, 622 S.W.2d at 244
(although appeals court, like trial court, found indenture agreement was not ambiguous, appeals
court's interpretation of contract differed from trial court).
106. See Morgan Stanley, 570 F. Supp. at 1541-43 (although court found nonrefunding pro-
vision ambiguous, court allowed issuing company to redeem securities).
107. See id.; Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 612-15 (issuer able to redeem preferred stock from
proceeds of common stock sale).
108. See Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 616 (court emphasized that careful drafting could have
alleviated need for litigation); Harris, 622 S.W.2d at 248 (court stated that if bondholders want
absolute protection, security agreement must state clearly those intentions).
109. See Morgan Stanley, 570 F. Supp. at 1541 (underwriters and security purchasers must
understand that court will interpret contract in light of existing law when contract formed).
110. See Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 604 (plaintiffs raised claims under breach of third party
beneficiary contract theory, under adhesion contract theory, and under theory of Contra
Proferentum).
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agreement which allows a company to redeem constitutes an adhesion con-
tract between the security issuer and the security holder."' Generally, an
adhesive contract is a standardized contract formed between parties of un-
equal bargaining power containing unconscionable provisions that courts will
not enforce as a matter of public policy."' A security holder could raise the
argument that although the security holder rarely participates in the formula-
tion of the security agreement provisions, the terms of the agreement bind
the security holder." 3 Thus, since the security purchaser is in a bargaining
position unequal to the issuing company, any unconscionable features of the
security agreement should be unenforceable against the security holder. ,"4 The
plaintiffs in Edison raised an adhesion contract argument contending that
because they did not participate in drafting the preferred stock's redemption
provision, the court should support the plaintiffs' interpretation of the
provision.' While the Edison court noted that the Company drafted the
nonrefunding provision without negotiating with the stockholders and agreed
that unconscionable provisions of contracts between parties of unequal bargain-
ing power are unenforceable, the court found that the preferred stock's redemp-
tion provision, in light of the Company's interpretation of the provision, was
not unconscionable."1
6
Any security holder advancing an adhesion contract theory must show
111. See id. at, 616 (plaintiffs made claims that redemption provision was part of adhesion
contract).
112. See id. See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 CoLuM. L. REv. 629 (1943) (general survey of adhesion contracts).
113. See Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 613 (although stockholders did not negotiate refunding
provision, stock contract bound stockholders); Harris, 622 S.W.2d at 248 (bondholders who did
not negotiate with bond issuer still bound by indenture terms when bond certificate refers to
indenture terms); see also Erickson v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (D. Minn.
1972) (anyone accepting stock in Iowa corporation charged with knowledge of articles of incor-
poration); Rothschild v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 56 F. Supp. 315, 318 (E.D. Mo. 1944) (bondholders
charged with knowledge of terms of trust indenture); KENNEDY & LANDAU, supra note 3, at 27
(although security purchasers do not bargain for terms of security agreement, it is essential that
terms of agreement bind them).
114. See Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 616. But see Morgan Stanley, 570 F. Supp. at 1541
(sophisticated bond counsel represented both issuer and underwriter so no claim of disparate
bargaining power possible).
115. 451 F. Supp. at 616.
116. See id. While discarding the adhesion contract theory, the Edison court stated that
a corollary theory, Contra Proferentum, could aid courts in resolving disputes between security
holders and issuing companies with respect to the redemption provisions of security agreements.
451 F. Stipp. at 616. Contra Proferentum is a theory of contract construction which establishes
that if one party drafts the language of a contract to which the other party assents without truly
bargaining, a reviewing court may resolve any disputes against the drafter of the language. Id.
Contra Proferentum is only helpful, however, to resolve ambiguities in contract language. Id.;
see Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125, 154 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (court may invoke
Contra Proferentum only as "last resort" when all other methods of contract construction fail
to resolve ambituities), aff'd, 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956). The court in Edison found that giving
meaning to all the terms of the nonrefunding provision resolved any ambiguities and thus dismissed
the applicability of Contra Proferentum. See 451 F. Supp. at 616. But see Morgan Stanley, 570
F. Supp. at 1541 (court found language ambiguous but did not construe against drafter).
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that the issuing company's interpretation of the redemption provision is un-
conscionable and, therefore, a court should not enforce the provision as a
matter of public policy."' A redemption provision is not unconscionable,
however, merely because it allows the issuing company to redeem the outstand-
ing securities." 8 Indeed, some redemption provisions allow an issuing com-
pany to redeem the issued securities without limitation" 9 and some require
the company to redeem. 20 Showing a redemption provision to be uncon-
scionable and void as against public policy, therefore, would be difficult.
Another possible contractual claim that security holders may assert upon
redemption of their securities is that the issuer failed to give appropriate notice
of the redemption to the security holder. In Van Gemert v. Boeing Company,'2'
holders of convertible debentures 22 claimed that although Boeing, the issuing
company, redeemed its debentures in accordance with the terms of the deben-
ture agreement, the defendant company failed to give reasonable notice of
the redemption to the debenture holders. 23 The debentures in Van Gemert
provided that Boeing could redeem the debentures in accordance with the pro-
cedure set forth in the indenture agreement."' In addition to setting forth
provisions concerning redemption, the indenture agreement contained an ex-
planation of what notice Boeing would give to the debenture holders in case
of a redemption call.' 25 The notice of redemption would enable the debenture
holders to exercise their option to convert their debentures into Boeing com-
mon stock before Boeing could redeem the securities. 26 In accordance with
117. See Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 616 (because nonrefunding provision was not unconscionable,
plaintiffs could not rely on adhesion contract theory).
118. See id.
119. See supra note 15 (issuing company may reserve right to redeem preferred stock or
debt security).
120. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 508-13. Some debt security indenture agreements
establish a fund that the indenture trustee may use to redeem outstanding securities. See id. Redemp-
tion from the fund may be either mandatory or optional. See id. Companies also occasionally
include compulsory redemption provisions in preferred stock contracts. See BALLANTINE, supra
note 7, at 509. Companies include the provisions often to attract purchasers by providing the
purchasers with a right to redeem the preferred stock and thereby assure the purchasers that
they will receive a return of principal on their investment. Id.
121. 320 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975).
122. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 522. A convertible debenture is a debt security
that the holder may convert into another security of the issuing company, usually common stock.
Id. Thus, convertible debentures are "hybrid securities" containing features of both a debt and
an equity security. Id. at 523. See generally Katzin, Financial and Legal Problems in the Use
of Convertible Securities, 24 BUS. LAW. 359 (1969) (overview of convertible securities).
123. See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1374 (2d Cir. 1975).
124. Id. at 1376.
125. Id. The indenture agreement in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. provided that if the Boeing
Company desired to redeem its debentures, Boeing would have to publish a notice of redemption
at least twice in an "Authorized Newspaper" at least 30 days and not more than 90 days before
the redemption. Id. An "Authorized Newspaper" under the indenture agreement included those
newspapers published at least five days a week and generally circulated in Manhattan. See id.
at 1376 n.6. The indenture also stated that if a debenture holder registered the debenture with
Boeing, the debenture holder would receive mailed notice of the redemption. Id. at 1376.
126. See id. at 1375.
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the indenture provisions, Boeing published a notice of redemption in several
national newspapers.27 Several debenture holders failed to see the newspaper
notice Boeing published and, therefore, were unable to exercise their conver-
sion rights.'12 The debenture holders brought suit claiming that Boeing pro-
vided inadequate notice of the debentures' redemption which deprived the
debenture holders of their conversion rights.
29
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that the defendant company had complied with the notice provisions of
the indenture agreement and therefore did not breach its contract with the
debenture holders. 31 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that even though
Boeing's notice of redemption conformed to the requirements of the inden-
ture agreement, the notice did not apprise adequately the debenture holders
of Boeing's intention to redeem the convertible debentures.'"' The Van Gemert
court found that an implied duty exists in the contract between a debenture
holder and issuer requiring the issuer to give the holder reasonable notice of
what future notice the company will provide the debenture holders should
the company decide to redeem the debentures. 32 In particular, the issuer must
explain on the face of the debenture certificate the type of redemption notice
the company will provide the holder.' 33 The Van Gemert court reasoned that
if a company does not explain sufficiently what redemption notice the deben-
ture holder may expect, the issuer then must provide actual notice at the time
of redemption that adequately informs the debenture holders of the pending
redemption so that the debenture holder may have the opportunity to convert
the debentures into common stock.'
3
1
In Van Gemert, the debenture certificates did not contain an explanation
of what notice the issuing company would give in the event of redemption,
but merely stated that the company would give notice in accordance with the
terms of the indenture agreement.' 35 The Second Circuit held, however, that
127. See id. at 1377. The issuing company in Van Gemert released the required notice of
redemption to the New York Times, New York Herald-Tribune and the Wall Street Journal as
well as to the major wire services. Id.
128. Id. at 1379.
129. Id. at 1374.
130. Id. at 1375.
131. See id. at 1383-86. The Second Circuit stated that the notice Boeing gave to the deben-
ture holders did conform to the requirements of the indenture agreement. See id. at 1383. The
court held, however, that the notice was not reasonable or fair to the debenture holders because
the notice did not apprise adequately the debenture holders of the pending redemption. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id. The Van Gemert court stated that if the issuing company does not give adequate
notice on the face of the debenture concerning the type of notice the company will give in the
event of a redemption call, the company must inform the debenture holders what redemption
notice the company expects to give in "some other way." Id. The court did not explain in what
other way a company could give notice but it is clear that including the notice only in the inden-
ture agreement would be insufficient. See id. at 1383-84.
134. See id. The Van Gemert court felt that the issuing company had a duty to its security
holders to provide notice that would meet an investors' reasonable expectations regarding ap-
propriate notice of the debentures' redemption. Id. at 1383.
135. See id. at 1376.
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placing a notice agreement only in a complicated indenture was tantamount
to no notice at all.' 36 The court reasoned that the company could not expect
unsophisticated investors to send for, read, and understand the indenture.' 37
As a result, Boeing should have given the debenture holders actual notice at
the time of redemption sufficient to apprise the holders of the pending redemp-
tion so that the debenture holders could convert their debentures into com-
mon stock of the company. 3 Since the Van Gemert court found that Boeing's
newspaper notice was insufficient to inform the debenture holders of the
redemption call, the court found that Boeing breached its duty to the deben-
ture holders to provide a reasonably adequate notice of redemption.
39
Relying on Van Gemert, the security holder might have several arguments
against a company redeeming securities. The security holder could allege a
breach of an implied contract to give notice of redemption if the issuing com-
pany neither explains the agreement's redemption provision on the face of
the certificate evidencing the security nor gives adequate notice of the secur-
ity's redemption.'"" Secondly, by analogy, a security holder could argue that
an issuing company must explain any agreements affecting the security holders'
rights on the face of the certificate evidencing the security."II Just as the deben-
ture holders in Van Gemert successfully argued that the issuing company should
have placed notice provisions on the face of the debentures, any security holder
could argue that an issuing company must include, on the face of the cer-
tificate evidencing the security, explicit statements with respect to the manner
136. Id. at 1383.
137. Id. at 1383-84.
138. Id. at 1384. The Van Gemert court noted that Boeing easily could have provided better
notice to the debenture holders in several ways. Boeing could have published a more understand-
able notice of redemption or mailed notice to the debenture holders. Id. At the time of redemp-
tion, Boeing mailed proxy statements to Boeing security holders regarding an upcoming annual
meeting. Id. The court reasoned that Boeing could have provided notice-of redemption with the
proxy materials. Id. While the court stated that mailed notice and a more detailed published
notice might have been sufficient notice, the court did not explain in detail what notice a com-
pany must provide in case of a redemption call. See id.; c.f. Kaplan v. Varando, Inc., 341 F.
Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (press release in addition to publication satisfied requirement
of providing notice of debenture's redemption).
139. See Van Gemert, 520 F.2d at 1383.
140. See id. The Van Gemert court stated that a company issuing securities has a duty to
give reasonable notice of a redemption by virtue of the contract between the security issuer and
the security holder. Id. The duty to give notice of redemption in Van Gemert did not arise from
a specific contractual provision, but rather was inherent in the contractual relationship between
the security issuer and the security holder. See id. A purchaser of convertible debentures bargains
for a right to convert his debenture into stock of the issuing company so that if the company
fails to give the debenture holder reasonable notice of the redemption, the debenture holder will
not receive the benefit of his bargain. See id. at 1385; see generally Note, Convertible Securities:
Holder Who Fails to Convert Before Expiration of the Conversion Period, 54 CoRNELL L. REv.
271 (1969) (remedies for security holder who is unable to convert his securities).
141. See KENNEDY & LA mDAU, supra note 3, at 188 (substantive provision affecting rights
of security holders must be in text of security). But see Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d
929, 942 (5th Cir. 1981) (redemption terms only summarized on security itself while issuer places
details in indenture agreement); cases cited supra note 113 (language of security agreements bound
security holders when security certificates referred to terms of security agreements).
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in which an issuing company may redeem a security despite any nonrefunding
provision.' 2 Security holders could rely on the Van Gemert court's reasoning
that an issuer could not expect an unsophisticated investor to read intelligently
indenture provisions regarding notice and, accordingly, contend that an issuer
similarly could not expect security holders to discern from redemption provi-
sions in complicated indenture agreements the actual situations in which an
issuing company might redeem its securities.'43 The issuing company, therefore,
142. See KENNEDY & LANDAU supra note 3, at 188 (substantive provisions affecting rights
of security holders must be in text of security). A security holder also may argue that an issuing
company should include explicit statements with respect to how redemption provisions operate
on the face of a security to satisfy a court-implied contract of good faith. See Broad v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. 1981). In Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., the Fifth Circuit
applied New York law under which every contract contains an implied provision that the parties
will act fairly and in good faith. Id. A security holder might argue that to deal fairly and in
good faith, a security issuer should make clear to the security holders exactly how a company
will redeem outstanding securities. For example, on facts similar to Edison and Morgan Stanley,
a security holder could contend that the company should have explained on the face of the prefer-
red stock certificates or the debentures that the company could redeem the securities by issuing
common stock. At the very least, the company should include the "through refunding" language,
on the face of the security instrument instead of merely in a prospectus accompanying the secur-
ity issuance. See supra note 33 (nonrefunding provision containing "through refunding" language
in preferred stock prospectus); supra note 67 ("through refunding" language in debenture pro-
spectus). The Broad court, however, stated that the mere exercise of a company's contractual
rights would not constitute necessarily a breach of an implied convenant of good faith. 642 F.2d
at 957. The Broad court, discussing Van Gemert, reasoned that Van Gemert relied in part on
the notion of a breach of an implied covenant of good faith. See id. (citing Van Gemert principle
that covenant exists that neither party will act to destroy rights of other party under contract).
The court in Broad reasoned that in Van Gemert, the failure to publish proper notice deprived
the convertible debenture holders of one of the fruits of their contract, the right to convert the
debentures into common stock. See id. The Broad court concluded, however, that a security
holder could not use an implied covenant of fair dealing to gain more rights than the contract
provides nor could an implied covenant change the clear intent of the parties to the contract.
See id. at 957.
Thus, on the facts of Edison and Morgan Stanley, the security issuer could contend that
the failure to explain how the security's nonrefunding provision operated would not constitute
a breach of an implied covenant of fair dealing as the issuers, by redeeming their securities, did
nothing to deny the security holders the fruits of their contract. See Morgan Stanley, 570 F.
Supp. at 1532 (debenture holders received contractual redemption price); Edison, 451 F. Supp.
at 606 (stockholders received redemption price of par value plus 10% premium). Unlike the debenture
holders in Van Gemert, the security holders in Morgan Stanley and Edison arguably received
all of their contractual rights. See Morgan Stanley, 570 F. Supp. at 1335; Edison, 451 F. Supp.
at 613-15. But see Harris, 622 S.W.2d 239, 242-51 (court allowed issuer to redeem bonds at special
redemption price of par value of stock instead of regular redemption price of par value plus
premium).
143. See Van Gemert, 520 F.2d at 1383-84. In Harris for example, the bonds provided that
the company could not redeem with low-cost borrowing except through the Maintenance and
Improvement Funds. See Harris, 622 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. App. 1981). The Maintenance Fund,
however, operated under a provision of an old indenture agreement incorporated by reference
into the indenture agreement for the plaintiffs' bonds. See id. at 242-44. Relying on Van Gemert,
plaintiff security holders in a situation similar to the security holders in Harris could argue that
an issuing company could not expect the security holders to read both the indenture agreement
for their series of bonds and also all former indenture agreements incorporated by reference.
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should make clear on the face of a security certificate exactly how a redemp-
tion could operate.""'
In addition to relying on various contract claims with respect to the con-
tract between a security holder and an issuing company, security holders faced
with a premature redemption of securities could assert a contract claim on
the basis of a third party beneficiary theory by arguing that a redemption
violated the New York Stock Exchange (Exchange or NYSE) listing agree-
ment between the Exchange and the security issuer.' 45 In Edison, the plain-
tiffs claimed to be third party beneficiaries of the listing agreement contract
between the Exchange and Edison, which Edison allegedly had breached by
failing to provide to the security holders appropriate notice of its intentions
to redeem. 46 The plaintiffs argued that the NYSE Company Manual inter-
preting the listing agreement between Edison and the Exchange required Edison
to make a general news release when Edison's stockholders voted to increase
the number of common shares the Company could sell to the public because
this was action which "looked toward" redemption.' 7 The Edison court found,
however, that the Company released information to the press with respect
to the Company's possible intentions to redeem, although the wire services
did not publish the release. 48 The court found this release adequate to satisfy
any duty established by the listing agreement between the Company and the
Exchange.'"
In addressing the plaintiffs' reliance on the listing agreement between the
Exchange and the Company, the Edison court set forth the requirements that
a security holder must satisfy to establish liability under a third party beneficiary
theory.'° Initially, a security holder must show that the listing agreement vests
in the security holder third party beneficiary rights.'' Furthermore, the security
holder must show that the issuing company violated the listing agreement. 2
144. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (issuing company should place provi-
sions that affect security holders substantive rights on face of security).
145. See, e.g., Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1378-80 (2d Cir. 1975) (debenture
holders claimed to be third party beneficiaries of listing agreement); Pittsburgh Terminal Corp.
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1002, 1015 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (no liability under third party
beneficiary theory for issuing company's failure to give notice to convertible debenture holders
of dividend payment), modified, 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1982);
Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 611-12 (issuing company
made news release arguably required by listing agreement).
146. See Edison, 451 F. Supp. at 611.
147. See id. at 611-12. The plaintiffs in Edison contended that § AlO of the New York Stock
Exchange Manual (NYSE Manual) required any listed company to make a general news release
when the company took any action which "looked toward" redemption. Id. at 612. The stockholders
in Edison claimed that the Company anticipated redemption when it decided to issue common





152. See id. The Edison court stated that on the facts of the case the stockholders needed
to show that the listing agreement incorporated § AIO of the NYSE Manual, which required
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Since the Edison court found that the Company made the required news releases
and therefore did not violate the listing agreement, the court did not reach
the question of whether the listing agreement between the Exchange and the
Company vested the security holders with third party beneficiary rights.1
In Pittsburgh Terminal v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,s4 however, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania discredited
the third party beneficiary theory on the grounds that a listing agreement be-
tween the Exchange and a member company issuing securities did not exist
for the benefit of the security holders.1 55 In Pittsburgh Terminal, holders of
convertible debentures claimed that the issuing company's failure to inform
the debenture holders that the company would pay a dividend on its common
stock violated the NYSE listing agreement under which the company sold the
debentures.'5 6 The plaintiffs argued that the defendant company, in accordance
with the listing agreement, should have published notice'5 1 of the proposed
dividend to enable the plaintiffs to make an informed investment decision
whether to convert their debentures into common stock and receive the divi-
dend or to await redemption.15 The plaintiffs argued that the issuing com-
pany's failure to provide notice of the dividend payment violated the listing
agreement between the issuer and the Exchange. 5 9 The plaintiffs claimed to
be third party beneficiaries of the agreement between the issuing company
a general news release upon action looking toward redemption, and that the Manual required
the Company to make a release even if the Company's redemption plans were only tentative.
See id. The court's finding that the Company made the required release obviated the need to
discuss the other requirements. See id.
153. See id. The Edison court concluded that the Company made the news release the NYSE
Manual required even though the wire services did not publish the release. Id. In contrast, the
court in Van Gemert indicated that an issuing company would have to publish a news release
to satisfy § A10 of the NYSE Manual. See Van Gemert, 520 F.2d at 1377, 1378. The Van Gemert
court found that although the issuing company published notices sufficient to meet the precise
requirements of the issuing company's indenture agreement with its bondholders, the release did
not satisfy the listing agreement requirements because the release in Van Gemert did not detail
the rate of conversations and the exact date and time when the conversion privilege would expire.
See id. at 1378.
154. 509 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1981), modified, 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
- U.S. - (1982).
155. See id. at 1015-17. But see Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange
Rules, 66 COLUM. L. Ray. 12, 25 (1966) (investors are third party beneficiaries of some provisions
of listing agreements and accordingly should have redress for agreements' violations); Note, Theories
of Liability Under Convertible Debenture Redemption Notice Requirements, 44 FoRDHA L. REV.
817, 832-34 (1976) (investors may have third party beneficiary claims because design of some
listing agreement provisions is to protect investors); Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Viola-
tions of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 HAxv. L. REv. 825, 839-41 (1970) (suggesting third party
beneficiary theory valid because parties to listing agreement make agreements for benefit of
investors).
156. See Pittsburg Terminal, 509 F. Supp. at 1015-16.
157. See id. (listing agreement requires stock issuers to publish notice of any action taken
with respect to dividends to security holders and Exchange).
158. See id. (court held that issuing company gave no notice to the convertible debenture
holders of dividend payments).
159. See id. at 1014.
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and the Exchange, and, accordingly, asserted a private cause of action against
the issuing company based on the company's breach of the listing agreement. 0
The Pittsburgh Terminal court held that the debenture holders lacked a
private cause of action under a third party beneficiary theory, reasoning that
the listing agreement only regulated the relationship between the Exchange
and the issuing company.' 6' The parties to the listing agreement did not in-
tend to create a third party cause of action in favor of the plaintiff debenture
holders.1 62 Since the listing agreement only regulated the relationship between
the Exchange and the issuing company, the court held that the plaintiffs had
failed to establish that the plaintiffs were third party beneficiaries.' 63
While the Pittsburgh Terminal court held specifically that the NYSE listing
agreement does not provide security holders with third party beneficiary rights,
other courts have rendered decisions supporting the possibility that security
holders may have a cause of action under a third party beneficiary theory.' 6
The decision in Edison, for example, indicated that the listing agreement theory
was attractive.'65 In Van Gemert, the author of the majority opinion stated
that he could have based the issuing company's liability on a third party
beneficiary theory."66 Security holders will be able to prevail on the theory,
160: See id. at 1015-16.
161. See id. at 1016.
162. See id. The listing agreement between the New York Stock Exchange (Exchange) and
the listed company exists to benefit the Exchange and the listed company. See F. ZARB & G.
KEREKES, THE STocK MAR= HANDBOOK 98 (1970). Listing provides the listed company with
a means to gain wider recognition in the financial community, broaden the company's base of
ownership, and lower financing costs. See id. at 92. Listing agreements aid the Exchange by
assuring an orderly market for securities. See id. at 98. Many of the provisions in listing agreements,
however, also aid the investors, such as the requirement that companies annually distribute to
security holders financial information concerning the company. See id.
163. 509 F. Supp. at 1018 (court held plaintiffs failed to show private cause of action under
listing agreement).
164. See, e.g., Weinberger v. NYSE, 335 F. Supp. 139, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (investor may
recover on third party beneficiary theory against national stock exchange if exchange contract
created for benefit of investors); Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 190 Md. 52, 57 A.2d 318,
321 (1948) (investor may recover under third party beneficiary theory if he shows he was intended
beneficiary of contract). In reaching its decision in Pittsburg Terminal v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
the court noted that the NYSE Manual specifically provided that the listing agreement did not
give rise to any third party rights so that the debenture holders were not intended beneficiaries
of the listing agreement. Pittsburg Terminal, 509 F. Supp. at 1016.
165. See Edison, 571 F. Supp. at 612.
166. See Van Gemert, 520 F.2d at 1382-83 n.19. The author of the Van Gemert decision,
Judge Oakes, believed that a debenture holder could be a third party beneficiary to a listing
agreement between a listed company and the Exchange. See id. Judge Oakes contended that deben-
ture holders are creditor beneficiaries of a corporation. Id. Since a listed company has a duty
to treat its security holders fairly by virtue of the listing agreement contract, Judge Oakes rea-
soned that the security holders could be third party creditor beneficiaries of the listing agreement
and recover for a breach of the agreement. See id. But see Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
190 Md. 52, 57 A.2d 318, 321 (1948) (security holder suing for breach of listing agreement as
third party beneficiary is not creditor beneficiary); Theories of Liability, supra note 155, at 833-34
& n.124 (arguing that security holders may recover under third party beneficiary theory as creditor
beneficiaries only when issuing company makes promises to security holder, as opposed to
Exchange).
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however, only if the security holders can show that they are beneficiaries of
the listing agreement.'
67
In addition to asserting breach of contract claims, and depending on the
circumstances surrounding a redemption and the type of security outstanding,
a security holder may have a claim that the issuing company violated a fiduciary
duty to the security holder. While the rights of holders of pure debt securities' 6
are a matter of contract, corporations owe equity security holders a duty of
fairness and good faith because of the equity security holders' ownership in-
terest in the corporation.' 69 Convertible debentures, possessing features of both
debt and equity, present questions with respect to whether companies owe
fiduciary duties to the holders of the debentures.'" The existence of a fiduciary
duty, however, will not provide necessarily the security holder with any pro-
tection against redemption other than that provided by the security contract.'
7 '
Security holders raised a claim of breach of fiduciary duty in Broad v.
Rockwell International Corp.'"I In Broad, the plaintiffs purchased converti-
ble debentures in the Collins Corporation. Collins merged with the Rockwell
International Corporation and, under the terms of the merger agreement, Col-
lins stockholders received cash for their Collins stock. ' Under a supplemental
indenture addressing the effects of the merger on the rights of the convertible
debenture holders, the debenture holders received the amount of cash for their
debentures that they would have received had they converted their debentures
into common stock immediately before the merger. I Holders of the conver-
tible debentures brought suit claiming, among other things,"" that Rockwell
breached its fiduciary duty owed to the debenture holders by depriving the
167. See Pittsburg Terminal, 509 F. Supp. at 1016 (one requirement of third party beneficiary
doctrine is that plaintiff must show drafters of contract intended plaintiff to benefit from contract).
168. See supra note 1 (explaining distinction among debt, equity, and hybrid securities).
169. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-77 (Del. 1977) (corporate directors
owe high duty of care and good faith to stockholders).
170. See Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., Civil No. 76-5433 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1981) (available
on LExis, Genfed library, Dist. file) (issuing company owed fiduciary duty to convertible deben-
ture holders); Harff v. Kerkorian, 347 A.2d 133, 134 (Del. 1975) (fiduciary duty owed to conver-
tible debenture holders in special circumstances).
171. See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.,
562 F.2d 1040, 1055 (8th Cir. 1977) (no breach of fiduciary duty when corporation only acted
within its rights under stock contract by repurchasing stock); Ryan v. J. Walter Thompson Co.,
453 F.2d 444, 446 (2d Cir.) (stockholders rights under stock contract limited to terms of con-
tract), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1971); Fershtman v. Schectman, 450 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (2d
Cir. 1971) (limited partnership agreement controlled duty), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
172. 614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 929 (en banc), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). See generally Comment, Corporate Law-Bondholders Rights-
Trustee Under An Indenture, Issuing Corporation, and Successor Corporation Did Not Breach
Indenture or Fiduciary Duties To Holders of Convertible Subordinated Debentures By Eliminating
Bondholders' Conversion Rights Pursuant to a Merger, 30 EMoRtY L.J. 1167 (1981) (discussion
of Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.).
173. 642 F.2d 929, 934. (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
174. See id. at 936.
175. See id. at 932 (debenture holders alleged that Rockwell breached terms of indenture
agreement, breached implied convenant of good faith, and violated several federal securities laws).
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debenture holders of the option to convert into common stock of either Col-
lins or Rockwell.
176
The Fifth Circuit'" assumed that Rockwell owed a fiduciary duty to the
holders of the convertible debentures.' The Broad court noted that while
corporations generally owe fiduciary duties to their stockholders, some courts
have established the existence of a fiduciary duty that controlling stockholders
owe to corporate debenture holders and creditors.' 7 9 The Broad court rea-
soned, however, that the corporation had no duty to expand the rights of
the debenture holders beyond the right provided in the indenture contract."10
Since the court held that Rockwell did not breach the indenture agreement
and that the debenture holders received all of the rights owed to them under
the indenture agreement, Rockwell satisfied its fiduciary duty obligations.'
Applying the Broad reasoning, a security holder will be able to establish
that a company redeeming securities violated its fiduciary duty to the security
holder only if the security holder did not receive his contractual rights due
under the indenture agreement.182 Circumstances could exist, however, in which
a corporation acts in accordance with its strict obligations under a security
agreement and yet may breach its fiduciary duty to its security holders.' 83 For
example, in Green v. Hamilton International Corp,8" convertible debenture
holders filed suit against the Hamilton International Corporation alleging a
176. See id.
177. See 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), affig in part and rev'g in part Broad, 614
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas'
in Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. considered the plaintiffs' breach of duty claim and held that
since Rockwell did not breach the terms of the indenture agreement, the plaintiff debenture holders
did not have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. See id. at 939 (explaining district court's holding
that Rockwell's compliance with indenture agreement foreclosed claims of breach of fiduciary
duty). On appeal of the district court's ruling, a panel of the Fifth Circuit held that the indenture
agreement between Rockwell and the debenture holders was ambiguous, presenting a jury ques-
tion whether Rockwell had acted in accordance with the intent of the parties to the agreement
or had breached the agreement. See 614 F.2d at 426-29. The panel reasoned that Rockwell could
have met its fiduciary duty to the debenture holders if Rockwell either complied with the intent
of the parties to the indenture agreement or acted in good faith despite its breach of the terms
of the indenture agreement. See id. at 430-31. The Fifth Circuit subsequently granted a rehearing
en banc. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 618 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980).
178. See Broad, 642 F.2d at 958.
179. See Broad, 614 F.2d at 430; see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (under federal law, controlling stockholders owe fiduciary duty to
creditors as well as other stockholders); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (under
federal law majority stockholders' obligation of fiduciary duty protects creditors and other
stockholders).
180. See Broad, 642 F.2d at 918; supra note 171 (no duty owed to security holders beyond
performance of contract).
181. See 642 F.2d at 918.
182. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (no fiduciary duty beyond bounds of
contract).
183. See infra notes 184-202 and accompanying text (fiduciary duty may extend beyond strict
limits of contract).
184. Civil No. 76-5433 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist.
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breach of fiduciary duty for Hamilton's failure to inform the debenture holders
of a possible merger with the Household Finance Corporation.185 Hamilton
had discussed the sale of a subsidiary to Household Finance but negotiations
had failed and Hamilton subsequently issued a press release to that effect .''
The plaintiffs, relying in part on the press release, redeemed their debentures
instead of converting them into common stock. 2 Hamilton and Household
Finance, however, thereafter decided to merge.'88 After the merger, the value
of Hamilton common stock rose significantly.
189
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
charged the jury that Hamilton had a fiduciary duty to the convertible deben-
ture holders to make disclosures and correct misleading information to enable
the debenture holders to make informed investment decisions. 190 Furthermore,
the court stated that failure to divulge material facts that could influence a
convertible debenture holder's investment decision would constitute a breach
of the company's duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to the debenture
holders.' 9' After the jury found that Hamilton had breached its fiduciary duty
to the debenture holders, Hamilton moved for summary judgment, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial.' 92 The court denied the motions
holding that under Delaware law, holders of convertible debentures, under
"special circumstances,"' 93 could have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
against the corporation in addition to any other claims arising under the ex-
press terms of the indenture agreement. 94 According to the Green court, one
185. Id.
186. Id. In Green v. Hamilton Intl Corp., the Hamilton Corporation issued a press release
stating that Hamilton had broken off negotiations with the Household Finance Corporation with
respect to the sale of Hamilton's subsidiary corporation. Id. The press release, however, did not
explain that Hamilton had ended negotiations partly due to tax problems with the sale, and partly
because Hamilton was considering the possibility of a merger. Id.
187. Id. The plaintiffs in Green testified that information concerning a possible merger would
have affected materially their decision to redeem. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. Under the terms of the indenture agreement between the plaintiffs and Hamilton,
the plaintiffs in Green could have converted their debentures into common stock at $2.25 per
share. Id. Under the terms of the merger agreement, Household Finance bought Hamilton com-




193. See id. In addressing the possibility of breach of fiduciary duty claims for convertible
debenture holders, the Green court relied on Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975). In Harff, the Delaware Court of Chancery
specifically held that under Delaware law, convertible debenture holders were not equity owners
of a corporation and therefore the debenture holders indenture agreement with the issuing com-
pany determined the debenture holders' rights. See 324 A.2d at 219. The Harff court held, however,
that under certain "special circumstances" such as fraud, insolvency or a violation of a statute,
the rights of convertible debenture holders extended beyond the bounds of the indenture agreements
to encompass fiduciary obligations. See id. at 222.
194. See Green, Civil No. 76-5433 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1981) (available on LExis, Genfed
library, Dist. file). The Green court noted that under Delaware law, the fiduciary duty a corpora-
tion and its majority stockholders owe to minority stockholders also extends beyond the terms
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circumstance in which a convertible debenture holder could raise a fiduciary
duty claim is when the issuing company's actions adversely affect the conver-
sion option of the convertible debenture. 19S In such a case, a reviewing court
should treat the debenture as in the nature of an equity security and should
impose a fiduciary duty on the corporation for the benefit of the debenture
holders.' The Green court reasoned that Hamilton's issuance of a misleading
press release affected the debenture holders' conversion option and thus gave
rise to a fiduciary duty imposed on Hamilton.'97 The court concluded that
if the defendant company violated its fiduciary duty, the jury could find the
company liable under the court's special circumstances theory for construc-
tive fraud.'98
In Green, Hamilton, like the issuing company in Broad, argued that it
of the stock agreement. See Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Del. 1979) (ma-
jority stockholders owe duty to minority that majority cannot satisfy always by full compliance
with corporate procedures); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979-80 (Del. 1977) (con-
trollers of corporation owe fiduciary duty to minority stockholders and may not use position
to perpetuate control).
195. Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp. Civil No. 76-5433 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1981) (available
on LExis, Genfed library, Dist. file).
196. Id. The Green court noted, however, that an action for breach of fiduciary duty under
special circumstances only applied to holders of convertible debentures. See id. The court distin-
guished nonconvertible debenture holders, who the court termed mere creditors of the issuing
company, and to whom the issuing company did not owe a fiduciary duty beyond the bounds
of the indenture agreement. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id. The defendant company in Green argued that any fiduciary duty it owed to the
debenture holders only extended to an obligation not to commit common-law fraud. Id. The
defendant contended that the plaintiffs must show the existence of common-law fraud, including
a showing that the defendant company acted with scienter, to establish a claim of breach of
fiduciary duty. Id. The court in Green held that the plaintiffs did not have to prove that the
defendant company intentionally breached its covenant to act fairly. Id. The court distinguished
common-law fraud, which requires proof of scienter, from constructive fraud, which requires
only a showing of deceptive action and the existence of a fiduciary duty. Id. Since the issuing
company in Green owed a fiduciary duty to the convertible debenture holders, and since a jury
found that the issuing company had not dealt fairly with the debenture holders by publishing
a misleading press statement, the court affirmed the verdict that the defendant company breached
its fiduciary duty to the debenture holders. Id.
The Green court's holding that, under Delaware law, a convertible debenture holder may
have a claim against an issuing company for breach of a fiduciary duty under a theory of con-
struction fraud, arguably surpasses the holding in Harff. See id. In Harff, a Delaware court
interpreting Delaware law determined that under special circumstances, such as fraud, a converti-
ble debenture holder may have a claim against an issuing company for violation of a fiduciary
duty outside the limits of the indenture agreement. See Harff, 347 A.2d at 134. The Harff court
reasoned that declaring a dividend only for the financial benefit of the controlling stockholders
was a special circumstance allowing the debenture holders to assert a claim of breach of a fiduciary
duty because the controlling stockholders were intentionally looting the corporation. See id. The
Harff court seemed to base its decision to allow a claim for breach of fiduciary duty on the
existence of an actual common-law fraud. See id. In contrast, the Green court was a federal
court applying Delaware law. Green, Civil No. 76-5433 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1981). The court in
Green, claiming to rely on Harff, allowed convertible debenture holders to claim a breach of
fiduciary duty by the issuing company based on constructive fraud. See id. Thus the federal court
in Green may have read Delaware law more broadly than would a Delaware court.
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had not breached the security agreement between Hamilton and the debenture
holders, and thus had not breached a fiduciary duty.'99 The Green court
distinguished Broad on the basis that in Broad, the merger did not extinguish
the rights of the convertible debenture holders.20 0 In contrast, the debenture
holders in Green did not receive sufficient advance notice of the merger to
allow them to convert their debentures into common stock and receive the
benefits of an increased stock price. 2 ' The Green court concluded that while
the issuing company allowed the debenture holders to exercise the right to
convert their debentures into common stock, the issuing company did not treat
the debenture holders fairly when the company issued misleading information
material to the debenture holders' decision to convert.
20 2
To raise a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against an issuing company
with respect to the redemption of a security, the security holder first must
prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship. 20 3 While a corporation owes
a fiduciary duty to its equity security holders, and possibly to its debt security
holders, a corporation may satisfy the duty by allowing the security holders
199. Green, Civil No. 76-5433 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1981).
200. Id.; see supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text (since debenture holders received
same rights as common stockholders, issuing company did not breach either indenture agreement
or fiduciary duty).
201. See Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., Civil No. 76-5433 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1981) (available
on LExis, Genfed library, Dist. file).
202. Id. In addition to a possible claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the issuing com-
pany, a holder of a bond or debenture issued under an indenture may have a claim of breach
of fiduciary duty against the indenture trustee. See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929
(5th Cir.) (en banc) (plaintiff debenture holders alleged breach of fiduciary duty against inden-
ture trustee), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). In Broad the debenture holders claimed that
the indenture trustee violated a fiduciary duty by failing to divulge information regarding the
merger. See id. The plaintiffs claimed first that the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (Act) created
a fiduciary duty for the trustee in addition to the duties specified under the Act. See id..; U.S.C.
§ 77ooo(a) (1976) (duties of indenture trustee). The Broad court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim,
holding that the Act creates no duties beyond the specific duties set forth in the indenture agree-
ment. See Broad, 642 F.2d at 959; see also Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp.,
560 F.2d 1078, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (claim that trustee violated fiduciary duty under Act by failing
to negotiate better conversion price for debenture holders held frivolous); 15 U.S.C. § 770oo(a)
(1) (1976) (trust indenture agreement may include provision that trustee has no duties beyond
those duties specifically set forth in indenture agreement).
The Broad court held, however, that a trustee may be liable for violations of a fiduciary
duty under state law. See Broad, 642 F.2d at 959. The Fifth Circuit assumed without deciding
that under New York law, a trustee may have a fiduciary duty to debenture holders extending
beyond the strict bounds of the indenture contract. Id. (citing panel's conclusion that trustee
did have duties outside contract); see Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 196 F.2d 668, 670 (2d Cir.
1952) (trustee's obligation under New York law exceeds contractual duties and includes fiduciary
duties). The Broad court reasoned that had the contract been ambiguous, a question would have
arisen whether the trustee did all that he could have done to protect the rights of the debenture
holders. Broad, 642 F.2d at 959. Since the indenture agreement was clear and the debenture holders
did receive all of their rights under the agreement, the trustee had not violated his fiduciary duty.
Id. The court concluded that a trustee has no duty to procure for debenture holders rights that
exceed what the holders are due under the indenture agreement. See id.
203. See Broad, 614 F.2d at 418.
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to exercise all of the security holders' contractual rights.""4 In Green, the court
found a breach of a fiduciary duty because the issuing company materially
mislead the convertible debenture holders and thus affected their rights to ex-
ercise their contractual conversion rights. 0 5 With respect to an issuing com-
pany's right to redeem its securities, however, if the issuing company reserves
in the indenture agreement or stock contract the right to redeem a debt secur-
ity or preferred stock, then the company's exercise of that right probably will
not violate its fiduciary duty to the security holders. 20 6 In Edison, for exam-
ple, the company merely exercised its contactual rights by redeeming the plain-
tiffs' preferred stock.2 7 While the issuing company undoubtedly owed the
stockholders a fiduciary duty, no fiduciary claim was possible because the
issuing company's redemption of the preferred stock did not affect the con-
tractual rights of the shareholders.2 0 8 Similarly in Harris, even if the issuing
company owed a fiduciary duty to its bondholders, redeeming the bonds in
accordance with the terms of the bond indenture agreement would not have
constituted a breach of a fiduciary duty. 0 9
Depending on the facts of the case, a security holder may have several
claims against a security issuer when the issuer tries to redeem the securities.
20
If the language of a redemption provision provides the issuer with a right
of redemption, however, the holder can do little to prevent redemption.
2
11
The security holder will not be able to establish an issuer's liability for breach
of contract because the issuing company, by redeeming, merely will be assert-
ing its rights under the contract. 21 2 The security holder also may raise claims
under theories of adhesion contract, third party beneficiary, and implied
contract. 2" These theories, however, probably will not provide the security
204. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text (fiduciary duty satisfied if security holders
receive all of their contractual rights).
205. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
206. See Broad, 642 F.2d at 959 (company may have no liability for breach of fiduciary
duty if it complied with obligations under indenture agreement). The plaintiffs in Morgan Stanley,
Edison, and Harris, unlike the plaintiffs in Green, did not hold convertible securities. In Morgan
Stanley, Edison, and Harris since the security holders did not have a conversion option, any
misleading statements or omissions regarding a redemption of the securities were less likely to
affect adversely the security holders' contractual rights.
207. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text (Edison's redemption did not violate the
plaintiffs' stock contract).
208. See supra notes 180-81 (fiduciary duty satisfied if security holders receive all their con-
tractual rights).
209. See id.
210. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (plaintiffs may have claims against issuer
for breach of contract and claims under adhesion contract, Contra Proferentum, and third party
beneficiary theories); supra note 41 (possible claims under securities laws).
211. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text (since courts apply contract principles
to redemption disputes, if contract provides right of redemption then issuer may redeem).
212. See id.
213. See supra note 110 (claims against issuer under adhesion contract, and third party
beneficiary theories); supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (claim under implied contract
to give reasonable notice of redemption and to explain redemption rights on face of security).
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holder with an adequate basis for a claim unless the security issuer has acted
unfairly."' The security holder also could make a claim of breach of fiduciary
duty against the issuing company." ' If the security holder received all of his
rights under the security contract,however, the security holder will be able
to show breach of a fiduciary duty in only limited situations. 1 6
The solution to redemption problems lies only in better drafting. 217 If a
security holder wants protection from redemption, he must draft the security
agreement to reflect those desires. 218 For example, the security agreement could
provide that the securities could not be redeemed through refunding or through
the proceeds of equity financing. While the security purchaser does not par-
ticipate in the actual drafting of security agreement provisions, the purchaser
may exert influence by refusing to purchase until the contract reads as he
desires. Once an investor purchases a security, however, he should be bound
by its terms.
CHARLES A. BLANCHARD
214. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text (redemption provisions not unconscionable
so claims under adhesion contract theory difficult); supra notes 145-67 and accompanying text
(third party beneficiary theory); supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (implied contract to
give reasonable notice of redemption and explain redemption features of security on face of security).
215. See vpra notes 168-209 and accompanying text (claims against security issuer for breach
of fiduciary duty).
216. See id.; supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text (special circumstances, including
fraud, in which debt security holder may have claim for breach of fiduciary duty outside bounds
of contract).
217. See supra note 108 (better drafting could reduce litigation over redemption rights).
218. See id. To prevent redemption of securities from the proceeds of a sale of common
stock, for example, the security purchaser could include in the security agreement with the issuer
prohibitions on redemptions through equity financing.
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